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Criminal Law-MISTRIAL DECLARATION- OVER DEFENDANT'S OBJEC-
TION, PROSECUTION MUST DEMONSTRATE HIGH DEGREE OF MANIFEST
NECESSITY OR REPROSECUTION WILL BE BARRED. Arizona v.
Washington, 434 U.S. 497 (1978).
Because of the protection afforded a criminal defendant by the
double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment, a mistrial declara-
tion pursuant to a prosecutor's request can result in a bar to subse-
quent prosecution.' Thus, the need for clear standards by which to
determine when a mistrial is necessary and not a bar to reprosecu-
tion is paramount. On February 21, 1978, this issue was partially
resolved by the United States Supreme Court in Arizona v.
Washington.2 The decision, however, did not reach all the ambigui-
ties and potential problems related to this mistrial issue.
On May 21, 1971, George Washington, Jr., was found guilty of the
first degree murder of a hotel clerk.' Two years later, the Superior
Court of Pima County, Arizona, ordered a new trial for the defend-
ant because it was discovered that the prosecution had withheld
exculpatory evidence from the defense. As the new trial began on
January 7, 1975, the defense counsel informed the prospective jurors
"that there was evidence hidden [by the prosecution] at the last
trial."' The prosecution immediately moved for a mistrial. The trial
judge granted the motion because jury knowledge of the previous
trial and the prosecutorial error was held to be prejudicial to the
prosecution. 5 In declaring the mistrial, the trial judge deviated from
established procedures. He failed to state expressly the "manifest
necessity" for the mistrial and failed to indicate for the record that
alternatives, in lieu of mistrial, had been considered and rejected.,
After the mistrial declaration, on January 24, 1975, the defendant
filed a special proceeding in the Supreme Court of Arizona,7 con-
tending that retrial was barred by both the double jeopardy clause
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V provides: "Nor shall any person be subject for the same offense
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb .... "
2. 434 U.S. 497 (1978), rev'g 546 F.2d 829 (9th Cir. 1977).
3. 434 U.S. at 499.
4. Id.
5. The prosecution argued that the prejudice to the jury could not be repaired by any
cautionary instructions, and that a mistrial was a "manifest necessity." The defense counsel
countered that his comment was invited by the prosecutor's previous reference to a witness'
earlier testimony and any prejudice could be avoided by curative instructions. Both the
prosecutor and the trial judge recognized that an improper mistrial ruling would preclude
another trial because of double jeopardy limitations. Id. at 500-01.
6. Id. at 501.
7. The defense filed both a "special proceeding" which is similar to a common law writ
of mandamus or prohibition, and a petition for writ of habeas corpus. The defense also moved
to dismiss or quash the information. Id. at 501 n.6.
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of the fifth amendment and the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution. Despite the silent
record and the constitutional allegations, the Supreme Court of
Arizona declined to accept jurisdiction.8 The defendant next sought
habeas corpus relief in the United States District Court for the
District of Arizona. He argued that reprosecution would violate the
double jeopardy clause.' While the federal district court found the
defense counsel's opening remarks improper and prejudicial, it
granted the writ of habeas corpus and barred reprosecution."' The
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
federal district court," but the United States Supreme Court, on
February 21, 1978, reversed. 2
Historically, the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment
has been made applicable to the states through the fourteenth
amendment." As a general rule, jeopardy attaches when the jury is
impaneled and sworn to try a case," or in a case without a jury,
when either side begins to present evidence. 5 This "first jury right"
is considered so fundamental that an improper, unnecessary
mistrial declaration can result in a bar to reprosecution.6
The Supreme Court first considered the retrial issue in 1824, in
United States v. Perez,7 where Mr. Justice Story formulated the
"manifest necessity" test. 8 According to Justice Story, a mistrial
8. Id. at 501. No justification for the refusal to accept jurisdiction was noted.
9. The defense dropped the previous due process allegations and relied entirely on the
double jeopardy contentions.
10. 434 U.S. at 501-02. The court expressed the view that before granting a mistrial
motion, the trial judge was required "to find that manifest necessity exists for the granting
of it." Id. at 501. In fact, the court indicated that a simple statement by the trial judge
acknowledging a manifest necessity would have been sufficient to defeat the double jeopardy
claim. This view, however, was not directly supported by case law.
11. 434 U.S. at 501-02. In his opinion, Judge Kilkenny characterized the defense counsel's
opening statement as improper. The court justified its affirmation by emphasizing that there
was no express finding of manifest necessity or an explicit consideration of alternatives.
Again, this view was not supported by any Supreme Court decisions.
12. 434 U.S. at 503. Generally, the Court held that the lower courts applied an inappro-
priate standard of review and attached too much significance to the form of the ruling. Mr.
Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Mr. Chief Justice Burger, Mr.
Justice Stewart, Mr. Justice Powell, and Mr. Justice Rehnquist joined. Mr. Justice Blackmun
concurred in the result. Mr. Justice White filed a dissenting opinion. Mr. Justice Marshall
also filed a dissenting opinion, in which Mr. Justice Brennan joined.
13. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 793-96 (1969).
14. J. MILLER, CRIMiNAL LAW 535-36 (1934). See, e.g., Cornero v. United States, 48 F.2d
69 (9th Cir. 1931) (jeopardy attaches when jury is impaneled).
15. McCarthy v. Zerbst, 85 F.2d 640 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 610 (1936).
16. J. MILLER, supra note 14, at 536.
17. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824) (retrial allowed after trial court, on its own motion,
discharged jury due to jurors' inability to agree on a verdict).
18. For in depth discussions regarding the manifest necessity double jeopardy issue see
Comment, The Double Jeopardy Dilemma: Reprosecution After Mistrial On Defendant's
CASE COMMENTS
declaration was proper, and thus not a bar to reprosecution
"whenever . . . taking all the circumstances into consideration,
there is a manifest necessity for [declaring a mistrial], or the ends
of public justice would otherwise be defeated."'" In Perez, the
mistrial was held to be manifestly necessary because the jury was
unable to reach a verdict. Thus reprosecution was permitted. 0 The
Court, however, failed to adequately define the terms, "manifest
necessity" or "the ends of public justice."'"
The Supreme Court first interpreted the Perez test in Simmons
v. United States" and concluded that if the ends of public justice
require a declaration of a mistrial, and if the necessity is obvious,
then the manifest necessity test has been met.13 This standard, as
enunciated by the Court, is now commonly labeled the Simmons
test. 4 It was followed in only four subsequent cases and has not been
directly applied since 1909.25
In 1949, almost sixty years after Simmons, the Supreme Court
employed a less restrictive Perez interpretation in Wade v. Hunter. 26
This less restrictive interpretation is now commonly referred to as
Motion, 63 IowA U.L. REV. 975,977-82 (1978); Comment, Double Jeopardy and Reprosecution
After Mistrial: Is the Manifest Necessity Test Manifestly Necessary?, 69 Nw U.L. REV. 887,
887-909 (1975).
19. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 580.
20. Id. at 579-81.
21. Supreme Court cases interpreting and applying these terms include: Arizona v. Wash-
ington, 434 U.S. 497 (1978); Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973); United States v. Jorn,
400 U.S. 470 (1971); Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963); Gori v. United States,
367 U.S. 364 (1961); Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949); Simmons v. United States, 142
U.S. 148 (1891).
22. 142 U.S. 148 (1891).
23. After the trial had commenced, the prosecution presented evidence regarding an
association between the defendant and a juror which had been denied on voir dire. Subse-
quently, other jurors read of this evidence in a newspaper. The Court permitted retrial,
holding that the trial judge had properly dismissed the jury and declared a mistrial. Id. at
148.
24. The Simmons test is somewhat similar to the most common Perez interpretation
which is called the Perez dual standard (to be discussed infra). However, the dual standard
is two separate tests. That is, either manifest necessity or the ends of public justice will justify
a mistrial under the dual standard while the Simmons test requires a prospect that the ends
of public justice will be defeated if the mistrial is not declared and that the necessity is of a
manifest nature, i.e., clear and obvious. See Double Jeopardy and Reprosecution After
Mistrial: Is the Manifest Necessity Test Manifestly Necessary?, supra note 18, at 892-95.
It is possible that a form of the Simmons test appeared before Perez. See United States v.
Coolidge, 25 F. Cas. 622 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 14,858).
25. Keerl v. Montana, 213 U.S. 135 (1909) (reprosecution not barred when jury, after two
days of deliberation, unable to reach verdict); Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71 (1902) (reprosecu-
tion not barred when jury unable to reach verdict); Thompson v. United States, 155 U.S. 271
(1894) (reprosecution not barred when mistrial declared because juror had also served on the
grand jury that indicted defendant); Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892) (reprosecu-
tion not barred when misrial declared after jury deliberated unsuccessfully for forty hours).
26. 336 U.S. 684 (1949).
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the Perez dual standard." The Court in Wade allowed retrial when
wartime maneuvers made it necessary to halt the trial and move the
trial situs. The Court concluded that a manifest necessity for the
mistrial existed since the situs of the trial was in a danger zone and
the ends of public justice required that the declaration not be a bar
to reprosecution in order to prevent the accused and untried rapist
from going free.
The Wade rationale (Perez dual standard) was applied twelve
years later in Gori v. United States.2 1 In Gori the Court permitted
retrial despite the fact that neither the court of appeals nor the
Supreme Court could tell why the trial judge had dismissed a juror
and declared a mistrial. 9 The Supreme Court justified the retrial
by acknowledging that the trial judge had held that the declaration
was in "the sole interest of the defendant."3 Apparently, the Court
included the interest of the defendant in the "public justice"
standard and broadened the Perez dual standard by deferring to
the discretion of the trial judge."'
In 1963, only two years after Gori, in Downum v. United States12
the Court retreated from the more liberal dual standard. In
Downum, the Court held that a mistrial was a bar to reprosecution
because the mistrial had resulted from the failure of a prosecution
witness to appear in court. The Court concluded that only a mani-
fest necessity, which the Court interpreted as an impracticability to
proceed, would justify mistrial that would allow retrial. This inter-
pretation is commonly referred to as the Perez single standard .3
27. Double Jeopardy and Reprosecution After Mistrial: Is the Manifest Necessity Test
Manifestly Necessary?, supra note 18, at 892-95. The Perez dual standard is achieved by
placing the emphasis on the word "or," thus making the "manifest necessity" and "public
justice" clauses separate and independent. This interpretation has been read to mean that a
court may discharge a jury without erecting a bar to reprosecution whenever there is a
manifest necessity for the act or whenever public justice would otherwise be defeated.
Usually, under this interpretation, manifest necessity is construed in the stricter sense of a
severe impracticability to proceed. Alone, this would be a severe test but when coupled with
the public justice rationale, the dual standard is much less rigorous, allowing more mistrials
to be justified with no bar to reprosecution. Id. at 893 n.20. See also Arizona v. Washington,
434 U.S. 497 (1978); Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973); Gori v. United States, 367
U.S. 364 (1961); Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949).
28. 367 U.S. 364 (1961).
29. This mistrial declaration was sua sponte and not pursuant to motions from either the
prosecution or defense. Id. at 365.
30. Id. at 369.
31. Id. at 368.
32. 372 U.S. 734 (1963).
33. Although a subpoena had been issued for the witness, his whereabouts were unknown.
This information was relayed to the prosecutor one day before trial, and the prosecutor made
no further check to determine whether the witness was available. Id. at 735-37.
34. The Perez single standard is an interpretation that permits the "ends of public jus-
tice" to justify a mistrial when it has been declared because of a manifest necessity. Note
CASE COMMENTS
Since the Court eliminated the public justice standard, this single
standard would make retrial after mistrial much more difficult to
achieve.
In 1971, this single standard was applied in United States v.
Jorn.3 The Court held that there could have been no manifest ne-
cessity for a mistrial declaration because there was a viable alterna-
tive, and refused to allow the ends of public justice to justify the
mistrial .3 In Jorn, that alternative was to issue a continuance order
so that the witnesses could have been properly informed of their
constitutional rights.3 1
Read together, Downum and Jorn stand for the proposition that
the mistrial evaluation is no longer totally a matter of judicial dis-
cretion.3 The trial judge must expressly weigh the alternatives be-
fore declaring the manifest necessity of a mistrial. 3 However, due
to a reorganization on the Supreme Court, the rigorous Downum-
Jorn requirements were short-lived.10
The Burger Court's initial review of double jeopardy standards
was in Illinois v. Somerville." In Somerville, the prosecution discov-
ered a defect in the indictment after the trial had commenced.
Under Illinois law a mistrial and re-indictment was the only proce-
dure available to cure the defect and allow retrial.42 The Court re-
turned to the Perez dual standard and held that retrial was not
barred by the double jeopardy clause. Either a finding of manifest
that the public justice standard, in this context, has no direct relation to the mistrial declara-
tion. This standard is more rigorous than the dual standard because if there was no manifest
need for the mistrial when it was declared, the mistrial will be held to be improper and thus
a bar to reprosecution. Therefore, if a mistrial was declared in order to prevent the defeat of
the ends of public justice but no manifest need was found to exist, the defendant would go
free. Id. at 738. See Double Jeopardy and Reprosecution After Mistrial: Is the Manifest
Necessity Test Manifestly Necessary?, supra note 18, at 892-95. See also United States v.
Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 (1971); Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963).
35. 400 U.S. 470 (1971).
36. The case involved a charge of willfully assisting in the preparation of fraudulent
income tax returns. The would-be witnesses were taxpayers for whom this service had been
performed and their testimony involved self-incriminating statements. The trial court judge
refused to allow the witnesses to testify until they had consulted a lawyer. The judge then
discharged the jury. On retrial, the information was dismissed on motion of former jeopardy.
Id. at 472-73.
37. Id. at 487.
38. See generally Scott v. United States, 202 F.2d 354, 355 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 344
U.S. 879 (1952).
39. See United States v. Grasso, 552 F.2d 46, 53 (2d Cir. 1977); The Double Jeopardy
Dilemma: Reprosecution After Mistrial on Defendant's Motion, supra note 18, at 980; Com-
ment, Retrial After Mistrial: The Double Jeopardy Doctrine of Manifest Necessity, 45 Miss.
U.L. J. 1272, 1275 (1974).
40. Justices Black and Harlan were replaced by Justices Rehnquist and Powell.
41. 410 U.S. 458 (1973).
42. Id. at 459-60.
19791
370 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:365
necessity or a finding that the ends of public justice would be served
would justify a mistrial which would not bar subsequent prosecu-
tion.13
In its reinstatement of the ends of public justice standard,
Somerville appears to have overruled sub silentio both Downum and
Jorn."1 However, the Somerville majority apparently viewed its
holding as consistent with Downum and Jorn by implying that the
Perez single standard was not a separate test but rather merely one
branch of the dual standard.4 5
The Court in Somerville, after recognizing the ends of public
justice standard, realized the probable confusion that would result
from its application. Consequently, the Court attempted to avoid
this confusion by holding that there are two instances when a
mistrial would not bar retrial: first, when an impartial verdict could
not be reached, e.g., jury prejudice; and, second, when a verdict of
conviction would undoubtedly be overturned on appeal due to an
obvious procedural error at trial, e.g., an insufficient indictment."
Undoubtedly, there are other instances when the public justice
standard would justify a mistrial and allow retrial; however, the
Somerville Court failed to clarify the issue further.
Although the Somerville Court adopted the Perez dual standard,
until Arizona v. Washington it was unclear as to which instances
were "manifest." It was also unclear whether the trial court had to
find expressly that at least one of the two standards had been met.
Undoubtedly, trial court judges were uncertain as to whether they
were required to record the alternatives that they considered (in lieu
of a mistrial) and whether their discretion would be honored.,7 Nev-
ertheless, prior to Washington in 1978, but after the 1973 Somerville
decision, there was little change in the state of the law regarding the
former-jeopardy-because-of-mistrial problem. 8
43. The Court stated:
In reviewing the propriety of the trial judge's exercise of his discretion, this Court,
following the counsel of Mr. Justice Story, has scrutinized the action to determine
whether, in the context of that particular trial, the declaration of a mistrial was
dictated by "manifest necessity" or the "ends of public justice."
Id. at 462-63.
44. See Double Jeopardy and Reprosecution After Mistrial: Is the Manifest Necessity Test
Manifestly Necessary?, supra note 18, at 904-05.
45. 410 U.S. at 463-71. Note that Downum held that a prosecutorial mistake was not a
valid reason to justify a mistrial and retrial. Thus the insufficient indictment, due to the
prosecution's negligence, would probably be considered an insufficient justification if the
single standard had been applied. Jorn was in fact dissimilar because there were alternatives
available in Join, but no alternatives were available in Somerville.
46. Id. at 464.
47. See Arizona v. Washington, 546 F.2d 829 (9th Cir. 1977).
48. See United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600 (1976) (if mistrial declared at request of
CASE COMMENTS
On February 21, 1978, the United States Supreme Court decided
Arizona v. Washington. While the majority readily conceded that
an inherent unfairness to the defendant results whenever a trial is
aborted, 9 the Court also recognized that the defendant's right to
have the trial concluded (first jury right) is sometimes subordinate
to the public interest in affording the prosecution a full and fair
opportunity to present evidence to an impartial jury. 0 In support of
this ends of public justice position, the Court cited Simmons v.
United States, in which the Court honored the trial judge's discre-
tion and allowed reprosecution for that very reason.' But the
Simmons test does not represent the Perez dual standard. Instead,
the Simmons standard only allows a mistrial declaration when it is
manifestly necessary in order to prevent the defeat of public justice.
In view of the limited following of Simmons in the past, the holding
in Washington is apparently reaffirming the Somerville adoption of
the Perez dual standard while broadening the ends of public justice
standard in order to allow the trial judge a high degree of discre-
tion.5" Therefore, it appears that the Court in Washington has made
the Perez dual standard much less restrictive, with the probable
result of more reprosecutions. 5
The Perez dual standard was further expanded in Washington by
requiring the prosecutor to shoulder the burden of justifying this
mistrial in order to avoid the double jeopardy plea. The Court
stated, "The prosecutor must demonstrate 'manifest necessity' for
any mistrial declared over the objection of the defendant."54 This
defendant, without judicial or prosecutorial manipulation, manifest necessity test is not
applicable due to implication of waiver).
49. 434 U.S. at 504. The Court, citing Illinois v. Somerville, stated:
The determination by the trial court to abort a criminal proceeding where jeopardy
has attached is not one to be lightly undertaken, since the interest of the defendant
in having his fate determined by the jury first impaneled is itself a weighty one
.... Nor will the lack of demonstrable additional prejudice preclude the defend-
ant's invocation of the double jeopardy bar in the absence of some important
countervailing interest of proper judicial administration.
Id. at 504-05 n.15.
50. Id. at 505. See United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. at 479-80.
51. 142 U.S. at 154.
52. See 434 U.S. at 511. The Washington Court concluded: "We recognize that the extent
of the possible bias cannot be measured, and that . . .some trial judges might have pro-
ceeded with the trial after giving the jury appropriate cautionary instructions." Id. The Court
also stated that, "[i]f the record reveals that the trial judge has failed to exercise the 'sound
discretion' entrusted to him, the reason for such deference by an appellate court disappears."
Id. at 510 n.28.
53. The Perez dual standard had always been considered the most lenient standard, but
did not include specific language with respect to the judge's discretion.
54. 434 U.S. at 505. "Whether the phrase 'manifest necessity,' 'evident necessity,' . .
or 'imperious necessity,' . is used, the meaning is apparently the same." Id. at 505-06 n.17
(citations omitted).
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requirement bears no mention of the use of the ends of public justice
standard to bolster the prosecutor's argument. The "public justice"
language elsewhere in the opinion, however, in combination with
the holding in support of reprosecution would probably support a
prosecutor's manifest necessity argument. 55
The Court in Washington recognized and attempted to clarify the
ambiguity surrounding the term "manifest necessity" by noting
varied degrees of necessity. Citing Winsor v. Queen,57 the Court
concluded that a "high degree" of necessity must be present in order
to permit reprosecution after a mistrial declaration." The Court
indicated that a "high degree" of necessity would include situations
where alternatives exist but are dismissed by the trial judge.59 Since
the Court failed to discuss specifically the future application of this
new requirement, the judge's discretion in considering those alter-
natives probably would be honored unless clearly erroneous.
The majority in Washington,60 the federal district court,"' the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,62 and Justice Marshall, 3 who
dissented in Washington, were in agreement that the opening state-
ment made by the defense counsel was improper. Furthermore, all
agreed that the statement could have resulted in jury prejudice
against the prosecution. 4 However, none of the aforementioned
courts or justices resolved the issue of the judge's failure to make
explicit findings justifying the mistrial in a similar manner.
The majority gave little explanation and cited virtually no prece-
dential authority for its holding with regard to the absence in the
trial record of an express finding of manifest necessity or other ex-
press justifications for the mistrial. The Court simply concluded
that a failure to explain the ruling more completely, or a failure of
55. See 434 U.S. 505-17.
56. See id. at 505-07.
57. L.R. I Q.B. 289 (1866) (Cockburn C.J.).
58. 434 U.S. at 506-07.
59. See id. at 511-12. Logically, the Washington Court stated that the public interest in
justice would be needlessly frustrated if the appellate court viewed "necessity" differently
from the trial court. So the Court pointed out that the mistrial was appropriate despite the
fact that it was not strictly necessary (alternatives were available, e.g., corrective instructions
to the jury). The Court said that "the overriding interest in the even handed administration
of justice requires that we accord the highest degree of respect to the trial judge's evaluation
.. " Id. at 511.
60. Id. The majority stated: "[Wle regard this issue [of the improper and prejudicial
nature of the defendant's remarks] as foreclosed by respondent's failure to proffer any Ari-
zona precedent supportive of his contention and by. . . the consistent opinion of the Federal
District Court and the Court of Appeals." Id. (footnote omitted).
61. 546 F.2d at 830.
62. Id.
63. 434 U.S. at 519-21.
64. Id. at 497, 517, 519-21.
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the trial court to use procedural language like "manifest necessity"
did not render the mistrial declaration constitutionally defective. 5
The Court reasoned that the record provided sufficient justification
for the state court ruling and, citing Cupp v. Naughten,6 held that
an explanation supporting a decision in this area was not constitu-
tionally mandated. 7
Therefore, the Washington holding indicates that despite the
"high degree of necessity" requirement the trial judge need not avail
himself of the possible alternatives before declaring a mistrial (un-
like Jorn). Moreover, public justice considerations alone may justify
a mistrial (unlike Jorn and Downum) even though the Court re-
quires the prosecutor to demonstrate a "manifest necessity" for the
mistrial. Most importantly, the trial judge's evaluation of the situa-
tion will be accorded the highest respect and he will not be required
to make explicit findings as to manifest necessity or alternatives
considered. In this context, the holding seems clear. However, the
evaluation of a "high degree" of necessity or of "viable alternatives"
or of "public justice considerations" are still to be accomplished on
a subjective basis. This use of subjectivity without clearer guide-
lines may result in further confusion because the appellate review
of the cold record is also restricted to a subjective analysis.
Dissenting in Washington, Mr. Justice White noted the limita-
tions on the function of the Court and that it should not have under-
taken an examination of the record. This examination, according
to White, is a burden that should be placed on the district court and
not the appellate system. Therefore, Justice White would have
remanded the case to the district court to determine whether the
mistrial was necessary pursuant to the "correct legal standard. '70
But Mr. Justice White failed to recognize the fact that this "judicial
buck passing" without any clarification would have resulted in a
continuation of the confusion, since there still remained a lack of
established guidelines by which to measure the necessity of the
mistrial or the viability of alternatives.
Unlike Justice White, Mr. Justice Marshall, with whom Mr. Jus-
tice Brennan joined in dissent, did not object to an examination of
65. 434 U.S. at 516-17.
66. 414 U.S. at 146.
67. Cf. id. (the holding in Cupp was restricted to limited factual situations but included
the Washington situation).
68. 434 U.S. at 518.
69. Id.
70. Id. Justice White stated that the lower courts were "therefore in error in granting relief
without further examination of the record to determine whether the use of an incorrect legal
standard was sufficiently indicated by something beyond mere silence .. " Id.
1979]
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the record at the appellate level as long as the record was clear on
its face.7' Instead, their view was that the Court reached an im-
proper result because the silent record neither justified the termina-
tion of the trial; nor indicated that less drastic alternatives were
available." Thus since the record was not clearly indicative of a
single solution these dissenters simply would not have allowed re-
prosecution .
Although both dissenting opinions in Washington discussed the
problems that appellate courts face when reviewing a trial court's
mistrial declaration, the absence of specific guidelines due to an ad
hoc type of review suggests that a future review will be conducted
in a subjective manner." Therefore, as noted by the dissent in
United States v. Martin,75 the subjectivity of the review established
in Washington could result in a general reluctance by the trial judge
to grant mistrial motions. In other words, because of the possibility
that retrial might be barred due to an unfavorable appellate review,
the trial judge might allow a trial to proceed even though it is
marked by reversible error. A convicted defendant in such a case
will appeal, but he will not automatically escape trial. Clearly, this
reluctance to declare a mistrial could result in a great waste of both
time and money spent trying reversible proceedings."
If a trial judge does declare a mistrial, an appellate court could
use Washington to achieve varied results. Indeed, the Washington
decision could allow the appellate court to choose from a number
of standards. Hence, the standard chosen will be the one that best
accommodates the court's predetermined resolution of the double
71. Id. at 519.
72. Justice Marshall stated: "Where I part ways from the Court is in its assumption that
an 'assessment of the prejudicial impact of improper argument,' ante, at 514, sufficient to
support the need for a mistrial may be implied from this record." Id. at 520.
73. Justice Marshall concluded: "[lilt is not apparent on the face of the record that
termination of the trial was justified by a 'manifest necessity' or was the only means by which
the 'ends of public justice' could be fulfilled." Id.
74. Manifest necessity does "not describe a standard that can be applied mechanically
or without attention to the particular problem confronting the trial judge." Id. at 506.
75. 561 F.2d 135 (8th Cir. 1977). In Martin, the prosecutor read a grand jury transcript
which contained irrelevant and highly prejudicial material to the jurors at trial. The defense
moved for a mistrial. Normally, the double jeopardy clause would not bar reprosecution
because the defendant had requested the mistrial; however, the court held that the double
jeopardy clause protects defendants against governmental actions intended to provoke
mistrial requests. Therefore, the mistrial declaration was held to be a bar to subsequent
prosecution, notwithstanding the request by the defense. Id. at 136-38.
76. See generally Note, Double Jeopardy: The Reprosecution Problem, 77 HARv. U.L.
Rav. 1272, 1279-81 (1964); Comment, The Double Jeopardy Dilemma: Reprosecution After
Mistrial on Defendant's Motion, 63 IowA U.L. REV. 975, 988 (1978); Comment, Double Jeop-
ardy and Reprosecution After Mistrial: Is the Manifest Necessity Test Manifestly Necessary?,
supra note 18, at 908.
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jeopardy problem. When the reviewing court is primarily concerned
with reprosecuting the defendant, the ends of public justice lan-
guage can be used to achieve that result. If, on the other hand, the
defendant's right to be protected from possible double jeopardy is
considered to be of paramount importance, or if the court wishes to
protect the defendant from further prosecution, then the more strin-
gent manifest necessity language will be used to hold the trial
court's ruling erroneous and bar reprosecution. Therefore, although
the former-jeopardy-because-of-mistrial problem was partially re-
solved in Arizona v. Washington by specifying that a "high degree"
of manifest necessity is required, many ambiguities and possible
problems still exist.
THOMAS J. WALSH, JR.

